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Abstract. The Polish and the Hungarian governing party, PiS and Fidesz, are mnemonic 
warriors who had already tried to enforce their memory politics during their first govern-
ment terms, as their flagship museums, the Warsaw Rising Museum, opened in 2004, and the 
House of Terror in Budapest, opened in 2002, show. In museums they ‘inherited’ from their 
predecessors, the current governments either change content, as PiS at the Museum of the 
Second World War in Gdańsk, or ‘only’ battle against the directors in office, as happened at 
the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw and at the Holocaust Memorial Center 
in Budapest. Yet even mnemonic warriors cannot ignore international developments like 
the ‘universalization of the Holocaust’. As the author shows, the Polish and the Hungarian 
governments favored opening new museums over changing existing museums identified 
as ‘Jewish’, including those that explicitly deal with Polish and Hungarian complicity. New 
museums, like the Ulma Family Museum in southeastern Poland, the House of Fates in Bu-
dapest, and the Warsaw Ghetto Museum, focus on rescuers of Jews and uplifting messages 
of Polish and Hungarian heroism.
Ljiljana Radonić heads the ERC project ‘Globalized Memorial Museums. Exhibiting Atroci-
ties in the Era of Claims for Moral Universals’ at the Institute of Culture Studies and Theatre 
History at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna.
In their inspiring analyses of postcommunist memory politics, Michael Bern-
hard, Jan Kubik, and Anna Seleny have argued that both Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz 
in Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedli-
wość, PiS) in Poland are ‘mnemonic warriors’.1 In contrast to mnemonic plural-
ists and mnemonic abnegators, mnemonic warriors ‘draw a sharp line between 
themselves (the proprietors of the “true” vision of the past) and other actors 
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who cultivate “wrong” or “false” versions of history’.2 Collective memory ap-
pears to warrior-politicians as largely non-negotiable. The meaning of events is 
determined by their relationship to a ‘golden era’ of national height. Mnemonic 
warriors claim that ‘the problems of the present (and the future) cannot be 
effectively addressed unless the whole polity is set on the proper foundation, 
constructed according to the “true” vision of history’.3 Alternative narratives 
of the past are, by definition, understood as distorted and, therefore, need to 
be delegitimized or ostracized.
Bernhard’s and Kubik’s comparative study of seventeen postcommunist 
countries focuses on national mnemonic actors and the ways the 1989 transition 
has been commemorated in the context of their respective national memory 
regimes. This restriction on the national context seems conceivable when it 
comes to the commemoration of 1989 and the 1956 revolution in  Hungary. Yet, 
I apply this concept of the mnemonic warrior to memory politics in connec-
tion to World War II and therefore must—instead of remaining at the national 
level—take international developments into stronger consideration. I compare 
memorial museums in two European countries, Poland and Hungary, cur-
rently run by mnemonic warriors. I examine parallels and differences in the 
development of the Hungarian and Polish museum landscapes, asking how 
these landscapes are affected by international trends. The comparison of Polish 
and Hungarian museums aims to demonstrate that even mnemonic warriors, 
whose aggressive memory politics succeeds in dominating the national narra-
tive—combined with an authoritarian backlash in both countries and severe 
cuts in democratic checks and balances—are heavily influenced by internation-
al developments: the Europeanization of memory and, above all, the univer-
salization of the Holocaust. I am interested in the varying ways in which the 
tensions between mnemonic warriors’ objectives and those international trends 
affect specific museums in Poland and Hungary: While PiS effectively changed 
the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, other museums—conceived 
as ‘Jewish’ and/or devoted to the Holocaust—remain unchanged in both coun-
tries. In Hungary, even the long-planned second Budapest Holocaust Museum, 
conceived by Fidesz, the so-called House of Fates, is still awaiting opening.
After briefly introducing the relevant international memory trends, I will 
show parallels between the two flagships of Orbán’s and the Kaczyński twins’ 
memory politics: the House of Terror in Budapest and the Warsaw Rising Mu-
seum. These two museums play a key role in understanding the memory poli-
tics of Orbán and Fidesz between 1998 and 2002, and of PiS between 2005 and 
2007. From there, I will go on to explore how the current Fidesz and PiS govern-
2 Michael Bernhard / Jan Kubik, A Theory of the Politics of Memory, in: Bernhard / Kubik, 
eds, Twenty Years After Communism, 7-34, 17.
3 Bernhard / Kubik, A Theory, 13.
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ments have dealt with museums ‘inherited’ from their political predecessors: 
the Holocaust Memorial Centre (HDKE) in Budapest, the Warsaw Museum 
of the History of Polish Jews (MHPJ), and the Museum of the Second World 
War in Gdańsk—the former two, in retrospect curiously enough, co-initiated 
by Viktor Orbán and Lech Kaczyński respectively. Finally, I will discuss the 
attempts to open new ‘counter’-museums, aimed at supplanting the ‘inherited’ 
museums in order to represent the mnemonic warriors’ dominant narrative on 
the Holocaust, in which the rescuers of Jews in both Poland and Hungary play 
a crucial part.
This article stands at the intersection of two projects. It draws from my re-
cently completed five-year habilitation project ‘World War II in Post-Commu-
nist Memorial Museums’, in which I analyzed how memorial museums in all 
East European EU member states exhibit the World War II period, and I exam-
ined the role EU accession talks played in their transformation. The in-depth 
 diachronic analysis of ten museums from Estonia to Croatia included the War-
saw Rising Museum, the House of Terror and the Holocaust Memorial Center. 
My new ERC project on Globalized Memorial Museums investigates how in-
ternational museum aesthetics translates into respective national contexts.4
In this article, the museums I visited several times during the five years, 
their permanent exhibitions, guidebooks, and museum officials’ publications 
and interviews serve as the main sources for the analysis.5 For the compari-
son, I apply critical discourse analysis of museums’ narratives, visual history, 
and hybrid media analysis. Even when dealing with well-researched museums 
like the House of Terror and the Warsaw Rising Museum I hope to show the 
innovative aspects of this endeavor: My understanding of museums as hybrid 
media that are more than merely the sum of texts, photographs, and objects 
allows a stronger focus on aesthetics and visual elements. In some cases, mu-
seums even send opposing messages when aesthetically copying international 
role models while transporting nationalist, historically revisionist messages 
on the text level. Furthermore, the comparison of the Hungarian and Polish 
cases allows discussion of the limits of the mnemonic-warrior concept when the 
internationally highly relevant topic of the Holocaust is involved. I argue that 
4 This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement 
No. 816784). The article is based on my lecture at the Centre for Historical Research of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences in Berlin in the context of the colloquium ‘Identitätsfabriken? 
Museen & historische Bildung in Polen’ in November 2019.
5 I hired native speakers for the analysis of newspaper coverage and key articles in Polish 
and Hungarian. Whenever I do not give a source for a quote from an exhibition, this quote is 
from my own research at the museums respectively from the photo-documentation I brought 
back home from each museum—except the House of Terror, which was the only one not to 
grant me a photo permit.
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while international criticism has drawn a lot from domestic political criticism 
and scholarly analyses within Hungary and Poland, domestic critics would 
have remained unsuccessful were it not for the international interventions.
The Universalization of the Holocaust and 
the Europeanization of Memory
The post-Cold War ‘memory-boom’ in the West has placed the Holocaust center 
stage as the ‘negative icon’6 of the 20th century. In the course of what was termed 
‘universalization of the Holocaust’, the Shoah has come to stand for a universal 
imperative requiring respect for human rights, in general, and a ‘container’ 
for the memory of various victims and victim groups.7 In engagements with 
violent pasts, the figure of the hero and/or martyr has been replaced by that of 
the victim—capturing either the individual and his/her ‘ordinary life before’, 
or referring to collective victimhood.8 The latter allows for an externalization 
of responsibility, creating a ‘Europe of victims’.9 Victimhood narratives com-
pete and various victim groups stress that they too have suffered ‘just like the 
Jews’.10
In Europe, the memory of the Holocaust became a negative founding myth at 
the beginning of the 21st century—thus adding a specific European dimension 
to the ‘universalization’:11 Postwar Europe was now understood as a collective 
that had developed shared structures in order to avoid a recurrence of the 
Holocaust. In response to the search for an identity that goes beyond a mere-
ly economic and monetary union, this founding myth provided a compelling 
common narrative for European politicians and those scholars who chose to 
participate in identity-construction. This is one of the reasons the International 
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)—founded in Sweden as a network 
of politicians and experts in 1998—aroused so much interest at the time, and 
today includes thirty-four countries, most of them European. The internation-
6 Dan Diner, Gegenläufige Gedächtnisse. Über Geltung und Wirkung des Holocaust, Göt-
tingen 2007, 7.
7 Daniel Levy / Natan Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter. Der Holocaust, Frank-
furt/M. 2001.
8 Henry Rousso, History of Memory, Policies of the Past. What For?, in: Konrad H. Ja-
rausch / Thomas Lindenberger, eds, Conflicted Memories. Europeanizing Contemporary 
Histories, New York/NY 2011, 23-38, 32.
9 Katrin Hammerstein / Birgit Hofmann, Europäische ‘Interventionen’. Resolutionen und 
Initiativen zum Umgang mit diktatorischer Vergangenheit, in: Katrin Hammerstein et al., 
eds, Aufarbeitung der Diktatur. Diktat der Aufarbeitung?, Göttingen 2009, 189-203.
10 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory. Remembering the Holocaust in the Age 
of Decolonization, Stanford/CA 2009.
11 Claus Leggewie / Anne Lang, Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung. Ein Schlacht-
feld wird besichtigt, Munich 2011.
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al Holocaust conference that took place in Stockholm on 27 January 2000, the 
fifty-fifth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz–Birkenau, recommended 
that countries introduce a Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January or another 
date connected to the murder of the Jews.12 While not officially defined as a pre-
condition for membership during the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004, 
these ‘standards’ were followed by the future member countries. Acknowledg-
ing the Holocaust became an implied, yet unuttered, entrance ticket to the EU.13
Yet, alongside this ‘Europeanization of the Holocaust’, since 1989 another 
re-narration of history has taken place in the eastern European countries.14 In 
the context of democratic transition, writing about the communist past ‘was 
also a means to get involved in politics. Historians were not the only producers 
of history but had to compete with former dissidents, journalists, and politi-
cians.’15 Along with the communist regimes, the narrative of the heroic antifas-
cist struggle has been delegitimized too. When it comes to monuments from 
the communist era, those were relocated rather than destroyed in most post-
communist countries,16 for example to statue parks in Budapest and Sofia or 
the Museum of Occupation in Tallinn, while in Croatia over 3,000 memorials 
for the Tito partisans’ antifascist struggle were destroyed.17 The trauma of com-
munist crimes, often evoked with symbols familiar to those specific for rep-
resentations of the Holocaust (railway tracks, carriages), has since 1989 become 
the principal focus of public memory discourses in postcommunist countries.18
12 Harald Schmid, Europäisierung des Auschwitzgedenkens? Zum Aufstieg des 27. Januar 
1945 als ‘Holocaustgedenktag’ in Europa, in: Jan Eckel / Claudia Moisel, eds, Universalisie-
rung des Holocaust? Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in internationaler Perspektive, 
Göttingen 2008, 174-202.
13 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945, London 2005. In contrast to the 
EU, when it came to NATO membership, a representative of the US State Department in 2003 
explicitly stressed that ths IHRA was ‘part and parcel of the creation of a community of values 
in the Euro-Atlantic world. […] We have in each of the seven NATO candidate-countries and 
in Central and Eastern Europe more broadly made clear that when you do business in an 
institution like NATO, you do it by appealing to the cooperation of your friends and allies 
on the basis of shared goals and values.’ James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution. Making 
Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe, London, New Haven/CT 2010, 112.
14 Marek Kucia, The Europeanization of Holocaust Memory and Eastern Europe, East 
European Politics and Societies and Cultures 30, no. 1 (2016), 97-119.
15 Valentin Behr, Historical Policy-Making in Post-1989 Poland. A Sociological Approach 
to the Narratives of Communism, European Politics and Society 18, no. 1 (2017), 81-95, 83.
16 Kenneth E. Foote / Attila Tóth / Anett Árvay, Hungary after 1989. Inscribing a New Past 
on Place, Geographical Review 90, no. 3 (2000), 301-334.
17 Juraj Hrženjak, Rušenje antifašističkih spomenika u Hrvatskoj 1990-2000, Zagreb 2002.
18 This dominant discourse is contested to different degrees within the respective coun-
tries, cf. Stefan Troebst, Jalta versus Stalingrad, GULag versus Holocaust. Konfligierende 
Erinnerungskulturen im größeren Europa, in: Bernd Faulenbach / Franz-Josef Jelich, eds, 
‘Transformationen’ der Erinnerungskulturen in Europa nach 1989, Essen 2006, 23-50.
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The resulting ‘divided memory’ between ‘East’ and ‘West’ has prompted 
representatives of postcommunist states to demand that communist crimes be 
condemned ‘just as emphatically’ as the Holocaust. Therefore, after the eastern 
enlargement of the EU, the new member states managed to reintroduce a nar-
rative focused on totalitarian crimes, yet, in contrast to the Cold War, this time 
they established it themselves for their own countries and the EU. In 2009, the 
European Parliament recommended that another memorial day be introduced, 
the date of the Hitler–Stalin pact of 1939, on 23 August, as the day when the vic-
tims of Nazism and Stalinism to be commemorated together. While the mem-
ory of the victims of Stalinism is thereby finally added to the European canon, 
the victims of both regimes are explicitly equated, which raises new problems. 
While the Holocaust Memorial Day includes the crimes of their own collective, 
the European Day of Remembrance externalizes responsibility to alien powers, 
the Nazis and the Soviets: National memory politics depicts one’s ‘own people’ 
as innocent victims of foreign oppression, while participation in the communist 
regime is omitted when speaking only about ‘the significance of the Soviet or-
der and occupation on and for citizens of the post-Communist States’.19
In this field of conflicting memories, museums are key producers of knowl-
edge about history. Public museums showcase which version of the past is 
canonized for identity purposes. Consequently, they are definitely not neutral 
spaces of knowledge transfer; they do not simply depict ‘what actually hap-
pened’. The museums are, rather, manifestations of cultural patterns and mech-
anisms of inclusion and exclusion that govern the relations between social, eth-
nic, and religious in- and out-groups—and are, therefore, contested spaces.20 
Memorial museums combine information about the past with commemorative 
elements and thereby spell out an inherent contradiction. While memorials set 
a certain version of history in stone, it is assumed that historical museums are 
concerned with interpretation, contextualization, and critique: ‘The coalescing 
of the two suggests that there is an increasing desire to add both a moral frame-
work to the narration of terrible historical events and more in-depth contextual 
explanations to commemorative acts.’21 The fact that so many recent memorial 
museums find themselves instantly politicized reflects the uneasy conceptual 
coexistence of reverent remembrance and critical interpretation.
19 Declaration of the European Parliament on the Proclamation of 23 August as Europe-
an Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, 23 September, 2008, https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0439+0+ 
DOC+XML+V0//EN. All internet references were accessed on 8 April 2020.
20 Monika Sommer-Sieghart, Historische Ausstellungen als ‘contested space’, in: Johannes 
Feichtinger et al., eds, Schauplatz Kultur – Zentraleuropa, Innsbruck 2010, 159-166.
21 Paul Williams, Memorial Museums. The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities, Ox-
ford 2007, 8.
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Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, opened in 1973, and the US Holocaust Memorial 
Museum (USHMM), opened in 1993 in Washington/D. C., were the first in-
stitutions to be designated ‘memorial museums’ in order to distinguish them 
from their in situ counterparts, located where the crimes were committed. The 
Yad Vashem museum was by no means a role model right from the start; this 
happened only in the course of the universalization of the Holocaust—and 
especially since the opening of its Holocaust History Museum in 2005. Today, 
the universalization of the Holocaust has rendered the memorial museum ap-
proach paradigmatic for dealing with twentieth-century atrocities, especially in 
postcommunist countries. USHMM and Yad Vashem have provided core refer-
ence points for the construction of museum narratives and designing aesthetic 
solutions: a universal moral orientation based on the ‘lessons’ of the Holo-
caust;22 a strong focus on individual victims, their personal stories, testimonies, 
photographs and objects; and aesthetic standards, such as darkened rooms 
with victims’ names written in white letters or auratic objects. Interestingly 
enough, nowadays also museums in situ refer to this archetypical aesthetics, 
even if they portray communist crimes as the greater evil. As I will show in the 
following, these ‘borrowed’ aesthetic solutions serve to deliver a completely 
opposite—collective—message.
Flagships of Fidesz’s and PiS’s Memory Politics
The most obvious sign that today’s Hungarian and Polish governments have 
a lot in common is the fact that the EU has initiated Article 7 procedures against 
Poland (in 2017) and Hungary (in 2018) for a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ of 
basic EU values by a member state: the ‘values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’.23 The initiation of the 
procedures was a reaction to the authoritarian backlash and the weakening of 
democratic checks and balances that has defined Fidesz’s politics since 2010 
and PiS’s since 2015.24
This authoritarian development is closely connected to the mnemonic re-
gimes the two parties have been trying to enforce. One commonality is that 
both former Polish president Lech Kaczyński and Hungarian prime minister 
22 Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Social Construction of Moral Universals, European Journal of 
Social Theory 5, no. 1 (2002), 5-85.
23 Treaty on European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/art_2/oj. Arti-
cle 7 procedures need unanimity, so Hungary can veto measures against the Polish govern-
ment, and vice versa.
24 Waldemar Hummer, Rechtsstaatlichkeitsprobleme in Ungarn und Polen – Misst die 
Europäische Kommission dabei mit zweierlei Maß?, EU-Infothek, 12 May 2017.
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Viktor Orbán participated in the transformation of 1989 and thus consider 
it something that was supposed to become a turning point, yet both Fidesz 
and PiS imagine the 1989 roundtable pacts as ‘“rotten deals” that resulted in 
“unfinished,” “corrupt,” or “stolen” revolutions and/or processes of democ-
ratization’.25 Therefore, the mnemonic warriors have initiated memory wars 
against the ‘pseudo-transition’ that failed to sweep away the socialists and 
provide ‘moral clarity’. PiS calls this polityka historyczna, their politics of his-
tory meant not as the analytical concept many scholars work with, but as 
a warrior’s undertaking, a weaponized term.26 In order to show how this pol-
itics, based on historically revisionist nationalist narratives, was shaped be-
tween 1998 and 2002 in Hungary and 2005 and 2007 in Poland, I will look 
at two flagship museums developed by Fidesz and PiS during the first gov-
ernment terms. Back then, both parties established institutions reflecting their 
visions, but were far from being able to enforce them as the sole legitimate 
narrative about the past.
The House of Terror in Budapest (2002)
Prime minister Viktor Orbán inaugurated the House of Terror state museum 
in a big rally during the election campaign in 2002, as a campaign goody for 
Fidesz voters.27 The museum is located at the historical site where people were 
detained, interrogated, tortured, or killed, both during the regime of the Arrow 
Cross Party (1944-1945) and by the communist regime after 1945. This institu-
tion is essential for understanding Fidesz’s narrative about the past: Although 
the building was only used by the security police until the 1950s, the chro-
nology displayed in the museum covers also a speech delivered by Orbán in 
postcommunist Hungary and the opening of the museum, as if to suggest that 
Orbán himself was involved in liberating Hungary.
25 Michael Bernhard / Jan Kubik, The Politics and Culture of Memory Regimes. A Com-
parative Analysis, in: Bernhard / Kubik, eds, Twenty Years after Communism, 261-296, 278. 
While this is a key argument for other PiS officials, it was somewhat more difficult for Lech 
Kaczyński himself to maintain it, given that he participated in the roundtable negotiations. 
Orbán on the other hand can stress his role in 1989, first of all his speech during the reburial 
of Imre Nagy, and at the same time criticize the ‘pseudo-transition’ that failed to vanquish 
the socialists. Cf. Seleny, Revolutionary Road, 40.
26 Katrin Steffen, Ambivalenzen des affirmativen Patriotismus. Geschichtspolitik in Polen, 
Osteuropa 56, no. 11-12 (2006), 219-233, 219; Peter Oliver Loew, Helden oder Opfer? Erin-
nerungskulturen in Polen nach 1989, Osteuropa 58, no. 6 (2008), 85-102, 102.
27 Péter Apor, Eurocommunism. Commemorating Communism in Contemporary Eastern 
Europe, in: Małgorzata Pakier / Bo Stråth, eds, A European Memory? Contested Histories and 
Politics of Remembrance, New York/NY 2012, 233-246, 233.
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The museum symbolically equalizes the Nazi and the communist eras. The 
parallelization of the symbols of the Arrow Cross and the red star already dom-
inates the façade and the entrance hall to the building. Yet, the Nazi era is only 
displayed in two-and-a-half rooms, out of more than twenty, and the Holocaust 
is represented mainly by a projection of ice flowing down the Danube, referring 
back to the fact that members of the Arrow Cross Party used to shoot Jews on 
the bank of the river. Where the exhibition does once refer to the Budapest 
ghetto, it argues that it was ‘lucky’ to be liquidated only in 1945—a strange 
choice of words, to say the least. When criticized for effectively marginalizing 
the Holocaust, the director of the House of Terror and front-woman of Fidesz 
memory politics, Mária Schmidt, responded that the Holocaust belonged in 
a separate Holocaust museum.28
The Horthy era (1920-1944) is depicted as a functioning multiparty system, 
while its antisemitic and authoritarian aspects are ignored. The museum guide-
book says: ‘Up to the time of the Nazi occupation of 1944, Hungary’s affairs 
were conducted by an elected, legitimate parliament and government, with 
representatives of active opposition parties sitting in the chambers.’29 Hun-
garian Jews murdered before the German occupation in 1944 are completely 
omitted.30 The fact that most Hungarian Jews were deported immediately af-
ter the Nazi occupation, most of them in May 1944, while Horthy was still in 
power, and long before the Arrow Cross Party came to power, is blurred.31 
Jews are depicted as leaders of the communist state in the 1950s, while it is not 
mentioned that many of them also became victims of communist terror after 
the 1945-1948 period.32
The vast majority of Hungarians are depicted solely as victims—except for 
the ‘Hungarian Nazis’ from the Arrow Cross Party, who allegedly ‘in great 
numbers’33 simply changed uniforms after 1945 and became communist state 
security. The ‘changing clothes’ room features very prominently fairly at the 
beginning of the exhibition tour. This puts forward a historically incorrect 
28 László Seres, Andrássy út 60, Élet és irodalom 46, no. 6 (2003); Regina Fritz, Gespaltene Er-
innerung. Museale Darstellungen des Holocaust in Ungarn, in: Regina Fritz /  Caro la Sachse /  
 Edgar Wolfrum, eds, Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Postdiktatorische Gesellschaften in 
Europa, Göttingen 2008, 129-149, 137.
29 Mária Schmidt, ed, House of Terror. Andrássy Street 60. Catalogue, Budapest 2008, 6.
30 Jeffrey Blutinger, An Inconvenient Past. Post-Communist Holocaust Memorialization, 
Shofar. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 29, no. 1 (2010), 73-94, 84.
31 Gerhard Seewann / Eva Kovács, Juden und der Holocaust in der ungarischen Erin-
nerungskultur seit 1945, Südosteuropa 54, no. 1 (2006), 24-59, 53.
32 István Rév, The Terror of the House, in: Sophie Wahnich et al., eds, Politics of Collective 
Memory. Cultural Patterns of Commemorative Practices in Post-War Europe, Vienna 2008, 
47-89, 65.
33 House of Terror Museum, Changing Clothes, https://www.terrorhaza.hu/en/ allando-
kiallitas/second_floor/changing-clothes.
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claim that the same people—and thus a limited number of Hungarians—were 
supposedly responsible for the crimes committed by communist state security 
as well.34 Therefore, when individual Hungarian perpetrators are shown and 
named in the ‘Gallery of Victimizers’ toward the end of the exhibition, this is 
the highly politicized prelude for the 1989 video in which Orbán features prom-
inently: The selection of victimizers looks arbitrary, but a closer look shows 
that the fathers of two Hungarian liberal politicians who were active when 
the museum opened, Iván Pető and Tamás Bauer, are shown, while prominent 
‘victimizers’, relatives of members of the museum’s board of trustees, are left 
out.35 Even some of those responsible for World War II atrocities are featured 
in the museum only in their subsequent capacity as ‘victims of communist 
dictatorship’.36 Their photographs and short biographies are exhibited in the 
prison cells in the basement: Here all anticommunist fighters are depicted as 
heroes ‘who sacrificed their lives or freedom in the fight against oppression’.37 
The museum presents individual stories only insofar as they contribute to the 
narrative of the heroic struggle for the ‘Hungarian cause’.
While most contributions about this well-researched museum focus on the 
narrative, this article goes beyond text analysis and contrasts the museum nar-
rative with aesthetic elements. On the aesthetic level, the House of Terror has 
adopted the model of the ‘Tower of Faces’ from the USHMM: Here, a three-sto-
ry installation is exhibited, comprising private photographs shot between 1890 
and 1941 of members of the Jewish community of Eišiškės in present-day Lith-
uania, who fell victim to a massacre in 1941. The House of Terror, too, exhibits 
portraits of the victims on a wall that ranges from the ground floor up to the 
roof. The apparent similarity notwithstanding, the photographs displayed in 
Budapest are not private in nature. In the case of the USHMM, Yaffa Eliach, the 
granddaughter of the village photographer, invested many years searching for 
those private photos and did her best to attribute them by name. In contrast, 
the House of Terror exhibits photos the communist police took for their own 
records. They are uniform mug shots of humiliated victims taken by the perpe-
trators. Thus, the Hungarian museum appears to copy the USHMM, but turns 
the individualizing installation into the opposite when exhibiting anonymous 
and humiliating shots of the perpetrators’ gaze, which all blur into collective 
victimhood. Moreover, the installation comprises only victims of the commu-
34 Krisztián Ungváry, Der Umgang mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit in der heuti-
gen ungarischen Erinnerungskultur, in: Bernd Faulenbach / Franz-Josef Jelich, eds, ‘Transfor-
mationen’ der Erinnerungskulturen in Europa nach 1989, Essen 2006, 201-220, 213.
35 Krisztián Ungváry, Orte der Erinnerung an kommunistische Verbrechen. Das ‘Haus des 
Terrors’ und der ‘Zentralfriedhof’, in: Matthias Weber et al., eds, Erinnerungsorte in Ostmit-
teleuropa. Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit und Perspektiven, Oldenburg 2011, 219-233, 222.
36 Schmidt, ed, House of Terror, 86.
37 Schmidt, ed, House of Terror, 84.
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nist era. Here, suffering under communism has not only been prioritized over 
the narrative of suffering under Nazism, but also the latter has been omitted 
entirely. Also, the so-called ‘Hall of Tears’ in the basement reminds strongly 
of the Children’s Memorial at Yad Vashem. This aesthetics originating from 
the turn toward the individual victim in ‘Western’ museology is placed here 
in a narrative of collective (Hungarian) suffering at the hands of communists, 
a few Hungarians, and German Nazis. This does not imply that Holocaust mu-
seums do not present collective Jewish suffering—all museums contribute to 
identity building and are thus highly political. Decisive is the degree to which 
(heterogeneous) individual victims are given a voice and represented in ways 
in which they chose to portray themselves, as against blurring them into an 
anonymous mass to signify organic national suffering.
The permanent exhibition at the House of Terror enforces this closed narra-
tive on the visitors—for instance, by controlling their path through the build-
ing: Visitors are forced to wait for an elevator, are then crowded into the narrow 
space of the painfully slowly descending hoist, while they listen to stories of 
the person who had to wipe away blood from the torture cells, on their way to 
the very same (reconstructed) torture cells in the cellar.
As mentioned before, this museum was the first Orbán government’s gift 
for its domestic audience: a museum that gives simple answers, externalizes 
guilt, promotes Hungarian collective victimhood, and does not afflict one’s own 
collective. Yet the need to signal Hungary’s EU-fitness in the course of EU acces-
sion talks, as well as sharp domestic and international critique38 of the House 
of Terror, motivated Orbán to initiate also the Holocaust Memorial Center. The 
House of Terror museum had been proposed by Fidesz MP Jószef Szájer in 1998 
and the foundation that was responsible bought the building for the museum 
in 2000. In 2001, Minister of Culture Zoltán Rockenbauer announced in par-
liament that in addition a Holocaust museum was to be opened in Budapest, 
but Fidesz approved its funding only in March 2002, weeks after the House of 
Terror opened.39 Since Orbán lost power in the 2002 elections, Fidesz could not 
control the content of the new Holocaust museum’s exhibition. This has led to 
opening up a space for a pluralistic museum landscape in the country.
38 Péter Morvay was the first to point out how important the international critique was in 
this regard, Péter Morvay, Alibimúzeum, Hetek, 22 March 2002. Cf. Richard Chaim Schneider, 
Wie Ungarn sich erinnert. Das Holocaust-Museum von Budapest, Die Zeit, 3 June 2004; Re-
gina Fritz / Imke Hansen, Zwischen nationalem Opfermythos und europäischen Standards. 
Der Holocaust im ungarischen Erinnerungsdiskurs, in: Eckel / Moisel, eds, Universalisierung 
des Holocaust?, 59-85, 76.
39 Brigitte Mihok, Erinnerungsüberlagerungen oder der lange Schatten der Geschichtsver-
zerrung, in: Brigitte Mihok, ed, Ungarn und der Holocaust. Kollaboration, Rettung und Trau-
ma, Berlin 2005, 157-168, 165; Gábor Csillag, ‘Little House of Terrors’. The Premises and 
Practices of the ‘House of Terror’ Museum, Budapest, Transversal 3, no. 1 (2002), 18-46, 21.
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Warsaw Rising Museum (2004-2006)
The Warsaw Rising Museum has a similar flagship function for PiS. Lech 
Kaczyński was the first PiS chairman when the party was founded in 2001, 
and Warsaw’s mayor before he became the president of Poland in 2005. Child 
of parents who had fought in the uprising of 1944,40 he initiated the Warsaw 
Rising Museum as a milestone for the Polish ‘Fourth Republic’ that he and his 
twin brother Jarosław had envisioned.41 Once PiS had won the 2005 parliamen-
tary elections, and Lech Kaczyński had become president at the end of the year, 
the Kaczyńskis tried to enforce their version of the past. PiS’s first ‘memory law’ 
was an attempt to target those who publicly claimed Polish complicity in the 
murder of Jews during World War II. An amendment to the Penal Code—re-
ferred to as Lex Gross, a reaction to Jan T. Gross’ book on non-Jewish Poles who 
murdered their Jewish neighbours in the village of Jedwabne—was first passed 
in 2006. The law was eventually struck down in a ruling of the Constitutional 
Tribunal at a time when democratic checks and balances were still functioning.
A key element of the so-called Fourth Republic idea was to install memory 
politics as a guideline for the national political strategy. Its founding myth is 
a ’patriotic’ heroic narrative embodied first in the Warsaw Rising Museum. 
Financed by the municipality of Warsaw, it opened in 2004; the permanent 
exhibition was finalized in 2006.42 Just as in the Hungarian case, there is no 
doubt what the visitors are being induced to feel: At the core of the museum 
beats the ‘heart’ of the uprising. It even reproduces the uprising’s soundscape 
and recreates ‘the atmosphere of those days’, as the text about it explains. Even 
stronger than the textual level, this central aesthetic element transports the mes-
sage of the museum: Visitors are supposed to touch and feel this ‘heartbeat’. In 
a museum that focuses on a heroic and martyrological Polish past and fades out 
any negative and controversial aspects,43 the Poles, the uprising, and the muse-
um are thus depicted as an organic unit. All wartime civilians appear to have 
quasi-naturally supported the uprising. Despite the huge losses after the Nazis 
40 Paweł Ukielski, Das ‘Museum des Warschauer Aufstandes’ als Erinnerungsort, in: Mat-
thias Weber, ed, Erinnerungsorte in Ostmitteleuropa. Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit und 
Perspektiven, Munich 2011, 209-218, 213.
41 For PiS the 1989 roundtable compromised the Third Republic and required a new, 
re-founded Poland (the Fourth Republic), in which the former communists would be com-
pletely purged from public life. Bernhard / Kubik, Roundtable Discord, 79.
42 Monika Heinemann, Die Musealisierung des Ghettos. Die Darstellung der Verfolgung 
von Juden während des Zweiten Weltkriegs in Warschauer Museen, in: Etienne François et 
al., eds, Geschichtspolitik in Europa seit 1989. Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen im inter-
nationalen Vergleich, Göttingen 2013, 470-490, 476.
43 Cf. Eugeniusz Cezary Król, Perzeptionen des Aufstands in Polen, in: Hans Jürgen 
Bömelburg / Eugeniusz Cezary Król / Michael Thomae, eds, Der Warschauer Aufstand 1944. 
Ereignis und Wahrnehmung in Polen und Deutschland, Paderborn 2011, 171-192, 185.
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suppressed the uprising, in the museum, as some critics have observed, visitors 
may gain the impression that heroic Poland and Warsaw won the battle.44
In contrast to the House of Terror, and given the huge number of Polish vic-
tims of Nazism, the museum does give a lot of space to the crimes committed 
against Poles during the Nazi occupation. On the other hand, this exhibition, 
too, foregrounds Soviet betrayal to a large degree. The exhibition begins with 
the persecution of the insurgents in the People’s Republic. In the guidebook, 
the uprising is defined as ‘the last attempt to save Poland from Soviet enslave-
ment’.45 The analysis of the guidebook shows that it devotes a lot of space 
to the equalization of the two totalitarian regimes: ‘The Germans wanted to 
destroy Polish national identity and Warsaw lay at its heart. […] The other in-
vader—the Soviet Union—had the same aim: to exterminate the Polish elite.’46 
In 2007, a room ‘The Germans in Warsaw’ was added in the cellar in response 
to visitors’ critical feedback—before, only a tiny part of the exhibition dealt 
with the German perpetrators.47 Thus, while the Nazi crimes feature promi-
nently, when it comes to perpetrators the Soviets are more prominent. Also, 
the Soviet perpetrators and traitors are characterized using a more emotionally 
charged language. The guidebook mentions Hitler in seven paragraphs, Stalin 
in twenty-five.48
Individual biographies can be found in numerous drawers throughout 
the exhibition. The guidebook shows seventeen objects that evoke empathy 
with individual insurgents, whose stories are told. One is a prayer written 
by an eight-year old girl for her father, who had fought in the uprising: ‘Shot 
in combat, the bullet stopped at the paper with the prayer written on it by 
his child’—informs the guidebook.49 Yet, only Poles are individualized in this 
manner, while members of other groups are not depicted in a way that would 
evoke similar empathy. The only ‘Jewish’ object shown in the guidebook is an 
anonymous armband with a Star of David. The guidebook also includes twen-
ty-four short biographies with portraits of the protagonists: insurgents, civilian 
helpers, Nazi and Soviet perpetrators. The only person cast as a victim in the 
2007 guidebook is a Jew: Edith Stein, who converted to Catholicism and was 
44 Piotr M. Majewski, Die Musealisierung des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Polen, in: Stefan 
Troebst / Johanna Wolf, eds, Erinnern an den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Mahnmale und Museen in 
Mittel- und Osteuropa, Leipzig 2011, 151-158, 156.
45 Lena Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook to the Warsaw Rising Museum, Warsaw 
2007, 51.
46 Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook, 63-64.
47 Monika Heinemann, Krieg und Kriegserinnerung im Museum. Der Zweite Weltkrieg in 
polnischen historischen Ausstellungen seit den 1980er-Jahren, Göttingen 2017, 79.
48 Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook.
49 Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook, 58.
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sainted by the pope in 1997.50 I am not arguing that Jews are underrepresent-
ed; the ghetto uprising and the Holocaust are, understandably, no more than 
marginal topics in the exhibition. Yet, what is striking are the different ways in 
which Poles and Polish Jews are represented in order not to let the Holocaust 
narrative overshadow that of ‘our’ suffering.
The guidebook calls the murder of the Warsaw population a genocide (lu-
dobójstwo)51 twice. Other terms, such as ‘systematic extermination of Poles’ (ek-
sterminacja) and ‘selection’ (selekcja) aim at equalizing Polish suffering with the 
Shoah: At the transit camps, ‘the Germans carried out a “selection” procedure, 
which decided the fate of the detainees—deportation to the territory of the 
General Government or to the Third Reich to forced labour, and in the worst 
case scenario—to concentration camps.’52 The terms ‘extermination’ and ‘selec-
tion’ wrongly imply the same mass murder process for Jewish and non-Jewish 
Poles.
The section devoted to the period following the crushing of the uprising 
depicts the collective victim of both totalitarian regimes:
‘The city slowly died. […] The Germans achieved their objective—not only to destroy 
Polish culture, but also to erase all its traces. The Soviet troops, stationed on the other 
side of the river, did not take any action to stop the Germans. Once again, the aims 
of Hitler and Stalin, deadly enemies, turned out to coincide, as far as policy towards 
Poland was concerned. It was very convenient for the Soviet dictator that the “bour-
geois” elite of the nation be destroyed and no trace of prewar Warsaw remain.’53
Paweł Ukielski, the deputy director of the museum, described the ultimate 
outcome of the uprising as a ‘victory postponed’.54 While its immediate re-
sults were tragic, the memory of having resisted totalitarianism sustained and 
strengthened people during communism. Real victory—informed by the mem-
ory of the rising and the legacy of the Polish underground state—comes about 
with the end of communism (still to be fully achieved according to PiS), a par-
allel to how the Hungarian uprising of 1956 is portrayed by Fidesz. Ukielski 
portrays the Third Republic of the 1990s as ignorant toward the past, while in 
the 21st century Poles realized that such a ‘cold’ community concept does not 
50 Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook, 68. The newer version of the guidebook from 
2015 is almost identical, yet Stein’s biography was substituted by that of Marek Edelmann 
who fought both in the ghetto and the Warsaw uprising. Lena Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., 
Warsaw Rising Museum. Guidebook, Warsaw 2015, 65.
51 Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook, 101-102.
52 Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook, 168.
53 Dąbkowska-Cichocka et al., Guidebook, 165.
54 Monika Żychlińska / Erica Fontana, Museal Games and Emotional Truths. Creating Pol-
ish National Identity at the Warsaw Rising Museum, East European Politics and Societies and 
Cultures 30, no. 2 (2016), 235-269, 248-249.
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work and that only a ‘memory community’ can bring real change. That is why 
the Rising Museum was founded, he claims.55
Analogous to Orbán’s role in Hungary, Lech Kaczyński initiated not only the 
Rising Museum, but also—supporting the Jewish Historical Institute’s initia-
tive—the Warsaw MHPJ. In 2005, the future museum was formally established 
as a public–private partnership of the Association of the Jewish Historical Insti-
tute, which was responsible for the permanent exhibition, the City of Warsaw, 
and the Ministry of Culture, which paid for the museum building. The first 
PiS government lost the election in 2007, and in 2010 president Lech Kaczyński 
died in an infamous plane crash. By this time, PiS had both laid the domestic 
founding myth for the Fourth Republic at the Warsaw Rising Museum and 
supported the international trend of Holocaust musealization, enabling a plu-
ralistic development of the museum landscape.
‘Inherited’ Museums
Between the first and the second Fidesz and PiS governments, new museums 
opened in the two countries. Two of them, the Holocaust Memorial Center in 
Budapest and the MHPJ were, as noted above, even initiated by Orbán and 
Kaczyński, respectively. Yet, all of them came to pose a problem once the war-
riors had returned to power and ‘inherited’ the museums from their predeces-
sors, whom Bernhard and Kubik framed as ‘mnemonic pluralists’.56
The Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest (2004-2006)
The Holocaust Memorial Center (HDKE) in Budapest is by no means as well 
known as the House of Terror. Unlike the latter, located centrally at the grand 
boulevard of Andrássy út, HDKE is situated on a tiny street, and hidden be-
hind high walls.57 This was criticized as ghettoization of the Holocaust, along 
with the fact that the museum is located in and under a synagogue. Neverthe-
less, the former Ferencváros synagogue at Páva Street was transformed into 
an extra ordinary museum. It has been the first Holocaust museum in a central 
European postcommunist country oriented toward international, ‘Western’ 
55 Paweł Ukielski, Der Warschauer Aufstand im Bewusstsein der Polen. Das Museum des 
Warschauer Aufstands als Erinnerungsort, European Network Remembrance and Solidarity 136 
(2006).
56 Bernhard and Kubik depict for example Tusk as ‘conciliatory and inclusive in his ap-
proach’, cf. Bernhard / Kubik, Roundtable Discord, 72. This of course by no means implies 
that Tusk and the Civic Platform were not pursuing their own political agenda, albeit never 
enforcing memory laws and a proud, patriotic memory as the only acceptable one.
57 Holocaust Dokumentációs Központ. Emlékeztetö, Magyar Narancs, 19 February 2004.
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role models, first of all the USHMM, one, moreover, relentlessly confronting 
the question of Hungary’s share of responsibility for the Holocaust. The ex-
hibition presents a counter-narrative to the nationalist House of Terror.58 It 
is thus somewhat surprising that the exhibition still exists in its original form 
in today’s Hungary, where memory is increasingly morphing into a direction 
imposed by Fidesz’s historical narrative.
The HDKE opened a few weeks before Hungary joined the EU, although 
only with a small temporary exhibition since the permanent one was not to 
be ready for another two years. Its establishment was as a result of the Eu-
ropeanization and universalization of the Holocaust. The HDKE aesthetics is 
modeled upon abovementioned role models: dark spaces, with white life lines 
of the victims on black background, belongings of victims in glass showcases, 
and other aspects. As its director, Szabolcs Szita, puts it, the HDKE follows 
a program ‘based on museum techniques from Western Europe’.59 The recent 
trend to focus on the individualized victim is clearly visible at the exhibition. 
Screens with the biographies of four Jewish and one Roma family accompany 
the visitor from room to room, through the deprivation of their rights, property, 
58 Apor, Eurocommunism, 233.
59 Judit Molnár, Pictures at an Exhibition. The Story of the Permanent Holocaust Exhibi-
tion From Deprivation of Rights to Genocide, 2004-2011, Cultures of History Forum (2012). Text 
in possession of the author (today unavailable at the online Forum).
Fig. 1: The Holocaust Memorial Center (All photographs courtesy of the author)
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freedom, human dignity and life. Beside the diary of Anne Frank, a diary of 
a Hungarian–Jewish girl is introduced: Lilla Ecséri, a year older than Anne, had 
to leave her flat taken over by the Germans, was separated from her mother and 
forced to perform hard labor, but managed to escape back to Budapest, and, 
eventually, survived the war. The last room, dedicated to Jewish reactions to 
the Holocaust, features quotes from the diaries of Adam Czerniaków and Samu 
Stern, leaders (Älteste) of the Jewish Councils of Elders (Judenrat) in the ghettos 
of Warsaw and Budapest, respectively. This allows the victims to speak with 
their own voices, which is crucial for an ‘integrated history’60 that combines the 
victims’ and perpetrators’ perspectives and gives agency to the victims.
Although a strong focus on individual victims’ stories bears the risk of fad-
ing out the perpetrators’ perspective, the HDKE extensively deals with per-
petrators as well. Not only the German personnel responsible for organizing 
deportations are named, but also Hungarian officials and gendarmes who sys-
tematically robbed Jews, raped, or tortured them. Some of them are shown and 
introduced by name. My comparison of memorial museums in all postcom-
munist EU member states has shown that the three photographs of Hungari-
an population looting a ghetto featured in this museum are rare examples of 
self-critically confronting the past on the visual level.61 While usually museums 
show representatives of authorities, police or military, here the unhesitant en-
richment by civilians is documented—even showing female perpetrators.
The exhibition furthermore unsparingly displays the Horthy regime as ‘right-
wing, antisemitic, nationalist and anticommunist’, and refuses to externalize 
responsibility to German occupation. One of the accompanying texts reads:
‘It was not under pressure from German leadership that Hungarian governments 
prepared the first anti-Jewish bills, and the Parliament and Regent Horthy passed 
them into law not in fear of the Nazi army, but under pressure from the Hungarian 
extreme right, and at most in emulation of the German model.’
The HDKE can thus be considered an outstanding example of ‘negative mem-
ory’62 as it does not blend out negative sides of the history of a country, but 
focuses, instead, on the crimes committed by perpetrators within society.
After Orbán became prime minister for the second time in 2010, the foun-
dation responsible for the museum dismissed its director, László Harsányi, 
after two years in office. At the same time, state secretary Levente András Gál 
60 Saul Friedländer, Nachdenken über den Holocaust, München 2007, 159.
61 Ljiljana Radonić, The Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest. An ‘Impossible’ Muse-
um?, Der Donauraum 1-2 (2014), 11-21.
62 Volkhard Knigge, Europäische Erinnerungskultur. Identitätspolitik oder kritisch-kom-
munikative historische Selbstvergewisserung, in: Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft e. V., eds, 
kultur.macht.europa—europa.macht.kultur. Begründungen und Perspektiven europäischer 
Kulturpolitik, Bonn 2008, 150-161, 157.
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demanded a more positive depiction of Horthy’s role, and stressed the need 
to make clear that the Hungarian invasion of Romanian territories was in no 
way connected to the later deportations—as the exhibition suggested and as 
was in fact the case.63 Although Fidesz discussed changing it several times, the 
permanent exhibition of the HDKE has not thus far been replaced. The Hun-
garian copyright law of 1999 protects exhibitions from smaller changes.64 There 
was only one short-term non-invasive exception: Nationalist critics objected 
to a photography of bishop Ottokár Prohászka next to one of Hitler. Prohász-
ka had been jointly responsible for the antisemitic numerus clausus passed in 
Hungary in 1920, and died in 1927.65 A curtain briefly hid Prohászka’s picture, 
but because any curious visitor would peer behind it, attracting even more 
attention, it was soon removed.
In 2011, renowned historian Szabolcs Szita was appointed as the new di-
rector of the HDKE. Szita focused strongly on the issue of Hungarians who 
saved Jews—the topic of his postdoctoral research. Yet he did not prompt 
a change of the exhibition. In 2014, his contract was not extended and the po-
sition was vacant for a long time. The institution was managed ad interim by 
György Haraszti, the Chairman of the Board of the Foundation. Salaries were 
not paid for several months in 2014 and the idea emerged to locate the HDKE 
under the management of the planned ‘House of Fates’ museum. In this phase, 
well-respected researchers from the HDKE, such as László Csősz, searched for 
employment elsewhere, which would grant a safer perspective. Finally, the re-
modeling plans were shelved for no obvious reason and Szita was reappointed 
in 2015.66 Since January 2019, another renowned historian, Tamás Kovács, has 
run the HDKE. What is interesting is that the Fidesz government has not tried 
to remove the permanent exhibition or to close the museum, but has used more 
‘subtle’ mechanisms to marginalize it, like not paying wages.
The Museum of the History of Polish Jews (2013-2014)
The MHPJ opened in 2013, the core exhibition in 2014. The MHPJ is situated 
at the site of the last headquarters of the Warsaw Jewish Council of Elders 
(Judenrat), where the ghetto uprising broke out in 1943. The building is sit-
uated opposite Nathan Rappaport’s and Leon Marek Suzin’s Ghetto Heroes 
63 Gyula Varsányi, Új úton az ‘Emlékezet Háza’. A Páva utca új vezetöi szerint nem lesz 
értermetlen racionalizálás, NOL, 20 May 2011.
64 Kiállítás mint gyűjteményes mű szerzői jogi védelme, April 2014, https://www.sztnh.
gov.hu/kiadv/ipsz/201402-pdf/szerzoijog.pdf.
65 Molnár, Pictures at an Exhibition.
66 Péter Hamvay, Bosszú a Holokauszt Emlékközpontban, Magyar Narancs, 3 September 
2015.
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Monument, inaugurated in 1948.67 In 2006, the museum expert, Barbara Kir-
shenblatt-Gimblett, a professor of performance studies at New York Univer-
sity and of Polish–Jewish background, was appointed to head the Academic 
Team of the Core Exhibition.68 Together with the museum’s former director, 
history professor Dariusz Stola, she repeatedly stressed that the MHPJ is not 
a Holocaust museum. It is a museum that deals with centuries of Jewish–Polish 
coexistence. And yet, most debates about this internationally much praised, yet 
within Poland much criticized, institution circle around antisemitism and the 
Holocaust.69
Whereas the Warsaw Rising Museum is highly praised by Polish national-
ist politicians and scholars, while non-nationalist scholars heavily criticize its 
heroic narrative, the MHPJ is criticized by both sides of the political spectrum. 
Polish nationalists perceive it as a ‘Jewish institution’ and claim that the MHPJ 
overemphasizes that ‘Poles did not help Jews enough’ during the Holocaust.70 
Critical antinationalist scholars, on the other hand, sometimes overdrew their 
critique, arguing that the exhibition was based on ‘the obsession with life and 
erasure of death’ attempting to ‘close the mourning after the Shoah, but also fit 
it into a sort of a new grand récit of the Red Sea: about life, salvation and time 
that heals all wounds’.71 While the direction of such critique is understandable, 
the verdict’s absoluteness is not.
The Polish studies expert and photographer Elżbieta Janicka criticizes the 
name POLIN, which was added to the museum’s name in 2014: the Hebrew 
word po-lin (‘rest here’) refers to the legend about Jews coming to Poland, which 
Janicka calls a ‘self-persuasion’ that Poland was a less hostile environment than 
it actually was.72 In Jews’ relations with non-Jewish Poles the ‘myth served as 
an instrument of mercy-evoking persuasion’. Finally, she argues that ‘the Polin 
67 The exhibition includes two fictional street reconstructions along the old Zamenhof 
Street, which the Jews of Warsaw had to take to reach the holding area prior to transportation 
to camps (Umschlagplatz). This in situ information is omitted, however, at both the ‘typical’ 
Jewish interwar street and the ‘Aryan’ street that are exhibited. Elżbieta Janicka, The Embassy 
of Poland in Poland. The Polin Myth in the Museum of the History of Polish Jews (MHPJ) 
as Narrative Pattern and Model of Minority-Majority Relations, Studia Litteraria et Historica 5 
(2016), 1-76, 5; Konrad Matyjaszek, Wall and Window. The Rubble of the Warsaw Ghetto as 
the Narrative Space of the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews, Studia Litteraria et 
Historica 5 (2016), 1-33, 25.
68 David G. Roskies, POLIN. A Light unto the Nations, Jewish Review of Books, Winter 2015, 
https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/1435/polin-a-light-unto-the-nations/.
69 Bryce Lease, Shared Histories and Commemorative Extension. Warsaw’s POLIN Mu-
seum, Theatre Journal 69, no. 3 (2017), 383-401; Janine Holc, POLIN Museum of the History of 
Polish Jews, The American Historical Review 123, no. 4 (2018), 1267-1269.
70 Anonymized statement obtained from a Polish museum official on 16 November 2019.
71 Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, Polin. ‘Ultimate Lost Object’, Studia Litteraria et Historica 5 
(2016), 1-8, 4.
72 Janicka, The Embassy, 15.
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myth has been seamlessly overtaken by the dominant group and included in 
the arsenal of symbolic violence as a tool of blackmail’.73 She thus insinuates 
that the museum gave in to portraying Jewish–Polish relations way too posi-
tively in order to get a museum at all.
In her extensive analysis, Janicka paraphrases a Polish nationalist aphorism: 
It is the MHPJ, therefore it has ‘Polish duties’.74 This seems to be an absolute 
no-go for her, whereas one might question her expectation that this museum 
be the one exception of a museum by no means compromised by memory pol-
itics. Considering that the museum was co-initiated by Lech Kaczyński and is 
co-funded by the Polish state, it is not so surprising that it had to compromise 
trying to fulfill ‘Polish duties’ as well. Those ambivalences need to be identi-
fied analytically. One can maybe sum up this problematic tendency as follows: 
While antisemitism is acknowledged, ‘the exhibition does not permit the story 
of suffering to cast too long a shadow over Polish-Jewish history’.75 It portrays 
Jewish–Polish relations using aesthetics akin to a fairy-tale, which clashes with 
the topic of antisemitism ‘presented in a dispersed way and on the periphery 
of the master narrative’.76
Undoubtedly, the exhibition tries to shed light on different perspectives, for 
example in the post–World-War-II arena on those Jews who left Poland as well 
as on those who stayed despite the persistence of antisemitic sentiments. The 
guidebook discusses postwar events as follows:
‘Dispersed units of the anti-communist underground attacked not only officials of the 
government apparatus, but also Jews, whom they considered “Commie Jews”, based 
on a common perception dating back to the early twentieth century. In addition, Jews 
wanting to return to their hometowns looked to the new authorities, and initially to 
the Soviet army, as their only guarantee of safety. This, too, contributed to the iden-
tification of Jews and communism.’77
The exhibition also deals with the village of Jedwabne, where non-Jewish Poles 
murdered Jewish Poles in 1941, as it deals with postwar pogroms. Nationalist 
critics see that as an unacceptably strong focus. Other critics have pointed to 
the unfortunate positioning of text in the exhibition, saying that ‘the informa-
tion comprising the weak message is placed below eye-level. One is forced to 
73 Janicka, The Embassy, 22.
74 Janicka, The Embassy, 25.
75 Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, Mixed Metaphors in Muranów. Holocaust Memory and Archi-
tectural Meaning at the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews, Dapim. Studies on the 
Holocaust 30, no. 3 (2016), 258-273, 259.
76 Janicka, The Embassy, 40.
77 Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett / Antony Polonsky, eds, Polin. 1000 Year History of Pol-
ish Jews, Warsaw 2014, 361.
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assume a position that is physically impossible to maintain for a prolonged 
period of time.’78
In regard to musealization techniques, the way the curators chose to display 
historic photographs is state-of-the-art. Shots taken by perpetrators are exhib-
ited in the context of the albums they came with, and their antisemitic context 
is explained in detail. The museum does show humiliating pictures of half-na-
ked victims before their execution, but they are hidden in symbolic woods and 
displayed in the size of the historical copy; the visitor has to decide whether 
to make an effort to see them. These photographs are contextualized through 
texts written by the people who took them. In contrast to that, the four ‘images 
in spite of all’79 from Auschwitz–Birkenau, taken by a member of the Jewish 
Sonderkommando responsible for burning the corpses, are displayed in a way 
that highlights their uniqueness while also contextualizing them.
Finally, whereas the Warsaw Rising Museum displays the Warsaw ghetto 
as something visitors can peer into through goggles, a ‘fotoplastikon’ showing 
rotating stereoscopic images of the ghetto, the MHPJ first shows the perspective 
of Jews inside the ghetto and later of non-Jewish Poles who drove through it 
78 Janicka, The Embassy, 41.
79 Georges Didi-Huberman, Images in Spite of All. Four Photographs from Auschwitz, 
Chicago/IL 2008, 11.
Fig. 2: The Mass Murder in the Village of Jedwabne Exhibited at the MHPJ
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by tramway, thus offering both an inside and an outside perspective. How-
ever, this depiction of non-Jewish Poles as witnesses or bystanders is highly 
problematic, since it depicts them as mostly indifferent, omitting that they also 
acted in antisemitic ways. In contrast, Jewish testimonies prove that indiffer-
ence would have been much better than what the ghettoized Jews actually 
experienced in many cases.80
Although the fact that the MHPJ discussion of antisemitism in Poland and 
Polish perpetrators stands in contrast to the ruling memory politics, it is clear 
that (for now) the Polish state is not in charge of the content of the permanent 
exhibition. The exhibition has not been changed after PiS won the elections in 
2015 and made ‘Down with the pedagogics of shame!’81 its new buzz phrase. 
Yet, PiS representatives heavily criticized director Dariusz Stola for the tem-
porary exhibition ‘Estranged. March ’68 and Its Aftermath’, dedicated to the 
state-staged antisemitic campaign, which opened in March 2018. PiS’s anger is 
connected to the fact that the exhibition closed with a wall of quotes: xenopho-
bic and antisemitic statements uttered between 1968 and 2018, mixed together, 
unattributed—but two of them clearly stemming from journalists close to PiS.82 
As a result, Stola’s contract was not prolonged; the Ministry of Culture insisted, 
instead, on an open call for applications for the position. Although Stola won, 
the minister refused to appoint him. In February 2020, Stola gave up so that the 
unclear situation would not block the museums’ work. Former deputy director 
Zygmunt Stępiński was appointed, first as interim and finally as permanent 
head of the museum.83
The Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk (2017)
In 2008, then prime minister Donald Tusk, of the party Civic Platform (PO), ini-
tiated a state-run Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, and appointed 
Paweł Machcewicz, a historian and university professor, as its founding direc-
tor. Machcewicz conceptualized the museum not as a military museum, but 
one that focuses on the brutality and catastrophic impact of the war on civilians. 
The curators embedded World War II in Poland in the international context. 
Compared with other postcommunist memorial museums, the exhibition is 
80 Janicka, The Embassy, 39.
81 Adam Leszczyński, Poland’s Leading Daily Feels Full Force of Jarosław Kaczyński’s 
Anger, The Guardian, 23 February 2016.
82 Maria Kobielska, History and Memory of 1968 in Poland. Debates Around the ‘Es-
tranged ‘68’ Exhibition, Cultures of History Forum, 28 September 2018, DOI: 10.25626/0090.
83 Poland: After Contentious Standoff, the POLIN Museum’s New Director, Zygmunt 
Stępiński, Begins a 3-Year Term Today (March 1), Jewish Heritage Europe, 1 March 2020, https://
jewish-heritage-europe.eu/2020/03/01/poland-the-polin-museums-new-director/.
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highly innovative, including not only the presentation of everyday life during 
the war, but also topics like gender relations, emotions and sex, relationships 
between peasant women and forced laborers, as well as camp brothels. Like the 
MHPJ, this museum also deals with the events at the village of Jedwabne and 
with other crimes non-Jewish Poles committed against Jewish Poles.
PiS, then an opposition party, attacked the plans for the museum from the 
very beginning. After it won the election in 2015, it tried to gain control over the 
institution by merging it with a not-yet-existing museum of the Westerplatte, 
where one of the first battles in German’s invasion of Poland marked the start 
of the Second World War. This plan was halted by the Voivodeship Adminis-
trative Court in Gdańsk, and so the museum was able to open, first to selected 
visitors in January 2017, then to the public in March. Given PiS’s objective to 
end, with the establishment of the Fourth Republic, the ‘pedagogics of shame’, 
it is only consequential that PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński would attack the 
museum. While still in opposition, he explained the aim of his new polityka his-
toryczna (history politics): ‘We will defend Polish interests, Polish truth. We 
will reshape the Museum of the Second World War so that the exhibition in the 
museum shows the Polish perspective.’84 Young Poles’ schooling should reflect 
pride and dignity, ‘not shame’ as it did thus far, he claimed. Dariusz Piont-
kowski, a PiS MP, repeated in 2016: ‘It is our right that museums built in Poland 
should portray the Polish perspective.’85 The parliament debated ‘whether the 
museum should be a cosmopolitan one in which British and American histori-
ans tell us how we Poles should conceive of the Second World War’.86 A former 
curator argues that because of PiS’s attacks against the museum a professional 
critique of the exhibition—which he thinks reproduced the Polish perspective 
too strongly despite its international parts—was impossible.87
The PiS government appointed three scholars to review the museum’s con-
cept. One of them, Piotr Niwiński, criticized the exhibition for lacking ‘the most 
noble motifs triggered by extreme situations. […] The exhibition is meant to 
warn against the horror of warfare, but few of its elements set such behaviours 
as patriotism, civic stance, or devotion to others as examples to be followed.’88 
Another reviewer, Piotr Semka, wanted the exhibition to focus on Polish mar-
84 Kaczyński zapowiada aktywną politykę historyczną, Dzieje.pl. Portal Historyczny, 29 June 
2013, https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/kaczynski-zapowiada-aktywna-polityke-historyczna.
85 As quoted in Daniel Logemann, On ‘Polish History’. Disputes over the Museum of the 
Second World War in Gdańsk, Cultures of History Forum, 21 March 2017, DOI: 10.25626/0061.
86 As quoted in Logemann, On ‘Polish History’.
87 Daniel Logemann, Rosenkranz vs. Bordell oder polnische Geschichte im Kontext. Eine 
kursorische Einschätzung zum Museum des Zweiten Weltkriegs in Gdańsk, in: Ljiljana Ra-
donić / Heidemarie Uhl, eds, Das umkämpfte Museum. Zeitgeschichte ausstellen zwischen 
Dekonstruktion und Sinnstiftung, Bielefeld 2020, 55-72.
88 As quoted in Logemann, On ‘Polish History’.
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tyrdom and the glory of the Polish army. The rest is history—at least to those 
readers familiar with the internationally infamous dispute: Only two weeks 
after the official opening of the museum, the Supreme Voivodeship Court over-
ruled the Administrative Court and the museum was, indeed, merged with the 
planned Westerplatte museum. This paved the way to replace the director by 
a new head of both institutions, Karol Nawrocki, a representative of the local 
branch of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN).89
In contrast to the HDKE in Budapest and the MHPJ in Warsaw, this mu-
seum’s exhibition was changed and continues to be changed, as I recorded 
through photo-documentation from my repeated visits, including to the initial 
exhibition. In November 2017, the new director replaced the five-minute film at 
the exhibition’s end. The initial film, a reflection on the long-term consequences 
of war around the globe, emphasized the universal meaning of the exhibition: 
a split screen showing the end of World War II; the founding of Israel; civilians’ 
experiences in wars after 1945; the death of Stalin; a few sequences from Poland 
including an antisemitic rally in 1968 combined with many international refer-
ences, for instance, to the Ku Klux Klan and Martin Luther King; 9/11, and the 
rise of Islamism. This was replaced by an animated heroic–patriotic film that 
focuses exclusively on Poland. It includes phrases such as: ‘We saved Jews’; 
‘We give life in the name of dignity and freedom’; ‘We were betrayed’; ‘The 
Pope gave hope of victory’; and ‘We do not beg for freedom, we fight for it’. 
Changing the film with which the exhibition ends changed the message from 
one of reflection on the horrors of war to one of patriotic glory.
Furthermore, two new text boards deal with ‘The Soviet Genocide on Poles 
and the Communist State of Mass Terror’, termed here as a ‘systematic ethnic 
genocide’ of the Polish minority in the Soviet Union before the war. Other mi-
norities had also been liquidated, the museum argues, but only in the Polish 
case as much as 18 % of the overall population were persecuted, of which 80 % 
were executed. Other changes in the exhibition include the addition of Polish 
‘heroes’, like the mathematician and cryptologist Marian Rejewski, who was 
the first to decrypt the Enigma code in 1932, as well as the Polish inmates of 
Auschwitz–Birkenau, friar Maximilian Maria Kolbe and Witold Pilecki.
One prominent change concerns the new focus of both Polish and, as I will 
show later, Hungarian memory politics, on ‘our’ citizens who saved Jews. 
Accordingly, in Gdańsk, a new board with a huge photograph of Wikto-
ria Ulma and her six children from Markowa were added in the middle of the 
Holocaust section. The Nazis killed the whole Ulma family in 1944 for hiding 
the Jewish family Szall and the sisters Golda und Layka Goldman, who were all 
89 Estera Flieger, The Populist Rewriting of Polish History Is a Warning to Us All, The 
Guardian, 17 September 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/17/
populist-rewriting-polish-history-museum-poland-gdansk.
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shot immediately after being discovered. Honoring rescuers and helpers dur-
ing the Holocaust is essential for an ‘integrated history’ of the Shoah. Yet, the 
way this ‘savior-turn’ works is that all the empathy is devoted to the non-Jewish 
Polish rescuers, whose story is told in an individualizing way, while the perse-
cuted Jewish Poles remain anonymous. Accordingly, the exhibition text reads 
as follows: ‘On 24 March 1944, all members of the Ulma family were murdered 
by Germans for hiding Jews in their house. At the time of the murder, Wikto-
ria Ulma was in very late pregnancy.’ That the ‘Jews’ were murdered as soon 
as the Nazis discovered them, and that their names and stories are known, is 
omitted, and their photographs are not shown. To present one’s own suffering 
as genocide, while referencing the murder of the Jews in the respective country 
merely as a side aspect suited to highlight the role of ‘our’ countrymen in sav-
ing Jews, is what I have called elsewhere the ‘Holocaust template’.90
Given the growing number of modifications, the founding director together 
with the museum’s other founding historians, Janusz Marszalec, Rafał Wnuk, 
90 Ljiljana Radonić, Introduction. The Holocaust/Genocide Template in Eastern Europe, 
in: Ljiljana Radonić, ed, The Holocaust/Genocide Template in Eastern Europe, New York/
NY, London 2020, 1-7.
Fig. 3: The Ulma Family at the Museum in Gdańsk
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and Piotr M. Majewski, have sued the new director over the infringement of 
their copyright for the exhibition’s content.91 In contrast to Hungarian law, 
where something similar would not be possible, the case could set a precedent 
in Poland in arguing that authors’ rights must be protected when it comes to 
exhibitions in the same way that publications are. The court’s decision is still 
pending.
‘Our’ Rescuers of Jews and ‘Counter’-Museums
Several new museums and memorial halls reflect PiS’s and Fidesz’s focus 
on Polish and Hungarian rescuers of Jews. The best known example is the 
‘Ulma Family Museum of Poles Who Saved Jews in World War II’ in the vil-
lage of Markowa in southeastern Poland.92 It opened in 2016 and is run by 
the PiS-dominated Subcarpathian Province’s administration and by Poland’s 
Ministry of Culture.93 The exhibition focuses on the Ulma family and other 
rescuers, while the wall in front of the museum displays plaques with names of 
Poles who saved Jews. Only ethnic Poles feature as rescuers, while those from 
the Ukrainian and Greek Catholic communities are omitted.94 On the other 
hand, a member of the Polish police involved in the murder of the Ulma family 
is portrayed as a non-Pole: ‘He was Greek Catholic and therefore some consid-
ered him a Ukrainian.’95
Another case in point is the Chapel of Remembrance in Toruń, ‘created to pay 
tribute to these Poles who risked their lives and the lives of their family members 
to save Jews during World War II’.96 It was initiated by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, 
the founder and director of the radio station Radio Maryja and ‘infamous for 
his anti-Semitic enunciations’.97 The chapel is co-financed by the Polish Foreign 
Ministry. The chapel’s website repeats the pattern of naming Polish rescuers, but 
not the persecuted Jews. Details are given about ‘Józef Ulma, his wife Wiktoria, 
who was heavily pregnant at the time, and their six children (the eldest one was 
91 Estera Flieger, To Muzeum powinno być dumą, Oko.Press, 24 November 2019.
92 Jan Grabowski / Dariusz Libionka, Distorting and Rewriting the History of the Holo-
caust in Poland. The Case of the Ulma Family Museum of Poles Saving Jews During World 
War II in Markowa, Yad Vashem Studies 45, no. 1 (2017), 29-60; Jörg Hackmann, Defending 
the ‘Good Name’ of the Polish Nation. Politics of History as a Battlefield in Poland, 2015-18, 
Journal of Genocide Research 20, no. 4 (2018), 587-606.
93 Its founding director, Mateusz Szpytma, a historian and employee of the Kraków 
branch of the IPN, comes from Markowa. Zofia Wóycicka, Global Patterns, Local Interpreta-
tions. New Polish Museums Dedicated to the Rescue of Jews during the Holocaust, Holocaust 
Studies 25, no. 3 (2019), 248-272, 251.
94 Wóycicka, Global Patterns, 261.
95 Wóycicka, Global Patterns, 261.
96 The Chapel of Remembrance, http://www.kaplica-pamieci.pl/eng#StageOne.
97 Wóycicka, Global Patterns, 257.
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8 and the youngest one was 1.5 years old)’. Yet again, the ‘eight Jews who were 
hiding [and] were killed as well’98 are not named. The room is dominated by 
an already familiar aesthetics: the names of the Polish rescuers written in white 
letters on a black background. In contrast, as shown above, the MHPJ in Warsaw 
portrays protagonists, Jewish and non-Jewish, in an individualizing way. The 
main protagonists here are the persecuted Jews.
Historian Jan Grabowski sums up why the savior-turn is problematic: ‘The 
Righteous were a desperate, hunted, tiny minority. […] They were not the 
norm. They were the exception.’99 The Shoah seems to threaten the narrative 
of one’s own suffering, given that 90 % of Polish Jews were killed, compared 
with 10 % of non-Jewish Poles. Therefore, tribute is paid to the universalization 
of the Holocaust, albeit in this very selective way, which is actually a ‘de-Hol-
ocaustization of the Holocaust’ that ‘goes hand in hand with the Holocaustiza-
tion of the history of the Polish majority’.100
In Budapest, Fidesz also plans to open a ‘counter’-museum to the ‘inherit-
ed’ Holocaust Memorial Center, in which Hungarian rescuers shall feature 
prominently. The so-called House of Fates was planned to be the highlight of 
the seventieth anniversary of the Holocaust in Hungary, in the commemora-
tion year 2014. The museum’s building is located in the reworked Józsefváros 
Railroad Station, from where Jews from the suburbs of Budapest were deport-
ed in 1944, mainly to Auschwitz–Birkenau. The name corresponds with the 
sister-museum’s name, the House of Terror—both museums are supposed to 
be run by Mária Schmidt. Yet, the House of Fates has not been opened, due 
to heavy criticism centered on its designated founding director as well as on 
the planned focus on deported Jewish children, as the most innocent victims, 
and—in a strong parallel to the Polish case—on Hungarians who saved Jews. 
Mária Schmidt intended the museum as a ‘story of love between Hungari-
an Jews and non-Jews’.101 She added: ‘The tragedy of the Holocaust must be 
brought to life for those who are in the lucky situation to be citizens of a free, 
democratic country.’102 Besides the questionable plan to bring the Holocaust 
‘back to life’, Schmidt at the same time uses the opportunity to stipulate that 
Hungary is a democratic state—in times of an increasingly disputable character 
of the Hungarian political system. While Schmidt insisted on implementing 
this historically revisionist agenda, János Lázár, head of the prime minister’s 
98 The Chapel of Remembrance, www.kaplica-pamieci.pl/eng.
99 Donald Snyder, Poland’s Dueling Holocaust Monuments to ‘Righteous Gentiles’ Spark 
Painful Debate, Forward, 27 April 2014.
100 Janicka, The Embassy, 3.
101 Mária Schmidt, A Love Story, Hungarian Globe, 3 October 2014.
102 As quoted in Keno Verseck, Budapester Versprechungen, Jüdische Allgemeine, 24 Oc-
tober 2013.
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office, who co-initiated the museum, took a more reconciliatory stand with 
domestic and international critics, evidently fearing to cause too much political 
damage. There are pragmatics even in a party dominated by mnemonic war-
riors. Lázár argued that if the Jewish community does not ‘support it, then the 
House of Fates will not be built’.103
In 2014, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary (MAZSIHISZ) 
had refused to take part in this distortion of history meant to improve the image 
of the Orbán government, and it still boycotts the House of Fates. But a smaller 
orthodox Jewish community, the Chabad-affiliated Unified  Hungarian Jewish 
Congregation (EMIH), headed by Rabbi Shlomo Köves, as of late supports 
Fidesz’s Holocaust museum, designated to open finally in 2021, at the ear-
liest.104 The different stands of the two Hungarian–Jewish communities reflect 
their different positioning toward the Fidesz government, and the difficult 
choices one has to make in increasingly authoritarian times, when the freedoms 
of speech and of the press are being eroded and democratic checks and bal-
ances are put into question. Both Jewish communities keep close relations with 
103 House of Fates, Mária Schmidt versus János Lázár, Hungarian Spectrum, 6 March 2015.
104 Will Orbán Retreat on Two Key Issues: CEU and the House of Fates?, Hungarian Spec-
trum, 3 January 2019.
Fig. 4: The House of Fates
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Israel and are well aware of Fidesz’s struggle to maintain good relationships 
with Israel, in contrast to the anti- Zionism dominant in the communist era. Yet 
MAZSIHISZ has chosen to criticize Fidesz for its historical revisionism, while 
EMIH has not done the same.
Gergely Gulyas, the head of the Hungarian prime minister’s office, who has 
been overseeing the establishment of the museum, sought to counter ‘fears’ 
that the involvement of Hungarians in the Holocaust might be downplayed 
in the new museum. Yet, for him, Hungarian responsibility goes no further 
than a failure of the state to ‘protect its citizens’ following the beginning of the 
German occupation in March 1944.105
On 5 September 2019, the Hungarian weekly Magyar Narancs leaked EMIH’s 
‘Vision Document’ for the House of Fates, which EMIH had presented to 
IHRA in June.106 So although an exhibition does not exist yet, it is possible to 
analyze this concept, which gives a quite clear idea about the plans. Given that 
its topic is the Holocaust, the tone of the document is disturbingly cheerful. It 
claims that the history of Jews in Hungary ‘offers an extraordinary opportunity 
to tell a rich, textured, engaging, relevant, and largely unknown story. It opens 
the door to weaving a distinctly Hungarian narrative, creating an institution 
and experience unlike any other.’107 The anonymous authors want to generate 
‘a buzz’108 by highlighting individual stories, evoking emotions and creating 
an immersive environment. The document tries to make sense of and draw 
positive conclusions from the Holocaust. Even when ‘the worst exclusions of 
the war era’ are mentioned, this happens in order to say that ‘lively interactions 
between Jews and their neighbours’ continued even in this period.109
The ‘anti-Jewish laws of the 1930s’ are mentioned four times, yet no one is 
named as being responsible for them.110 The Arrow Cross Party is mentioned 
only towards the end, yet wrongly referred to as the ‘Hungarian Iron Cross 
movement.’111 Hungarian perpetrator-ship is reduced to two mentions of ‘ac-
tive collaboration of the Hungarian authorities’.112 The focus still lies on chil-
105 Jeremy Sharon, Hungarian Chabad Affiliate Gains Ownership of Budapest Holocaust 
Museum, Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2018.
106 EMIH, House of Fates. Vision Document, [Budapest] 2019, https://m.magyarnarancs.
hu/belpol/ilyen-lesz-a-sorsok-haza-122682. Cf. Ferenc Laczó, ‘Authentic and Acceptable’. On 
a Certain Vision of Jewish Fates in Orbán’s Hungary, Hungarian Spectrum, 11 September 2019.
107 EMIH, House of Fates, 5.
108 EMIH, House of Fates, 11.
109 EMIH, House of Fates, 10.
110 EMIH, House of Fates, 14.
111 Yitzchak Mais, former director of Yad Vashem’s historical museum and new head of the 
museum’s steering committee since 2019, stated that the English proofreader ‘corrected’ the 
original text wrongly. Veszprémy László Bernát, Yitzchak Mais: I Don’t Want to Be Popular, 
I Want to Be Authentic, neokhon, 30 September 2019.
112 EMIH, House of Fates, 14.
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dren and ‘unique personal stories of Hungarian rescuers who chose, often at 
the risk of their own lives, to follow their conscience’.113 The goal is to
‘strike a balance, avoiding the implication that Hungary was simply a victim of out-
side forces, while equally steering clear of indicting Hungarian society as a whole. 
More importantly, suggesting collective blame can create a sense of hopelessness 
and/or defensiveness in visitors […]. People will understand the complexity of the 
Holocaust, and empathize with its victims, only if we avoid stigmatizing Hungari-
ans generally, and only if we offer an uplifting message of hope by citing those who 
acted nobly.’114
One such uplifting message is that ‘Budapest Jewry, for the most part, sur-
vived’115—without mentioning that most Hungarian Jews outside of Budapest 
did not. The other ‘uplifting’ claim is that the murderous slave labor in the 
Forced Labor Battalions ‘may, for some, have offered a sense of national soli-
darity […] as a way for Hungarian–Jewish citizens to do their civic duty in the 
defense of their country’.116
One can hardly imagine such an ‘uplifting’ Holocaust museum to be ac-
cepted, nor acceptable—even if Fidesz has claimed to have taken Schmidt off 
the project. That the international critique has the ability to affect mnemonic 
warriors is demonstrated by the fact that the Fidesz government has not been 
able, thus far, to open such a museum. The party struggles to find a balance 
between the benefit of historical revisionism for its nationalist cause and the 
need to give in to critique from abroad for the sake of international relations 
and at least partially include Hungarian perpetrators. We will see whether the 
House of Fates will really open in 2021.
In contrast to the Holocaust museum, a new memorial that the Fidesz gov-
ernment did erect during the Holocaust commemoration year 2014 is the 
Monument for the Victims of German Occupation on Budapest’s Freedom 
Square—although it was inaugurated in the middle of the night without a pub-
lic ceremony due to heavy criticism. It shows the archangel Gabriel, which 
represents Hungary, being attacked by the German Imperial Eagle (Reichsadler). 
The monument omits the collaboration of Hungarians in the Holocaust and 
externalizes all responsibility to the Germans. But it has become a symbol of 
the unwavering resistance of Jewish and non-Jewish Hungarians against their 
government’s historical revisionism: before and after the opening, there has 
been a constant protest against it in the form of a self-organized counter-exhi-
bition in front of the monument. One of the self-printed posters exhibited there 
113 EMIH, House of Fates, 9.
114 EMIH, House of Fates, 13.
115 EMIH, House of Fates, 15.
116 EMIH, House of Fates, 15.
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shows private photographs of the ‘Spiegel family, deported to Auschwitz by 
archangel Gabriel’.117
In Poland, the most recent museum aimed at challenging the narratives of 
‘inherited’ institutions is the envisaged Warsaw Ghetto Museum, to be opened 
in 2023, on the eightieth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. The mu-
seum is to be located in a former Jewish hospital, the Bergsohn and Bauman 
Children’s Hospital, next to the only remaining fragment of the ghetto wall. 
Given that the MHPJ does not integrate the ghetto site into its exhibition and 
stresses that it is not a Holocaust museum, the idea to create an in situ museum 
actually focusing on the ghetto sounds logical. Yet, as a Polish colleague told 
me,118 the Ghetto Museum is supposed to focus on the Polish perspective—in 
contrast to the MHPJ, which is perceived as a Jewish institution and accused 
of putting too much emphasis on the lack of help for Jews from Polish citizens. 
In fact, the museum concept is clearly based on the polityka historyczna of the 
PiS mnemonic warriors. It was established by minister of culture Piotr Gliński 
(PiS), who stated in 2017: ‘I would like this institution to speak of the mutual 
love between the two nations that spent 800 years here, on Polish land. Of the 
solidarity, fraternity, historical truth too, in all its aspects.’119 This quote shows 
that the museum is meant to challenge the MHPJ with this very similar focus—
and at the same time self-authorize its own version by being located at the only 
‘authentic’ ghetto wall location and in a building from the ghetto. The parallel 
to the Hungarian plan to tell a ‘love story’ between ‘us’ and ‘the Jews’ is strik-
ing. At the initial press conference devoted to the museum, the Polish prime 
minister Mateusz Morawiecki argued that ‘responsibility lies with Germans, 
with the German nation, but also with those who did not come to help, with 
the Allies’,120 in other words with everyone—except the Poles.
Albert Stankowski, the museum’s Polish–Jewish founding director, and the 
former head of the digital collection department of the MHPJ, insists that au-
thorities had not made any political demands, nor given any steering over the 
museum’s content. ‘If anybody gives any demands I will leave immediately. 
117 Ljiljana Radonić, Der Zweite Weltkrieg in postsozialistischen Gedenkmuseen. 
Geschichtspolitik zwischen der ‘Anrufung Europas’ und dem Fokus auf ‘unser Leid’, Ha-
bilitation thesis, University of Vienna, 2019, 77; Mark MacKinnon, Statue in Budapest Based 
on Second World War Evokes Dark History, The Globe and Mail, 15 December 2014 (updated 
12 May 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/statue-in-budapest-based-on-
second-world-war-evokes-dark-history/article22099406/.
118 Anonymized statement obtained from a Polish museum official on 16 November 2019.
119 As quoted in Poland. Warsaw Ghetto Museum Will Show the ‘Mutual Love’ between 
Poles, Jews, Times of Israel, 8 March 2018.
120 As quoted in Poland. Warsaw Ghetto Museum.
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But already the gossip has started to destroy the project.’121Also the museum’s 
chief historian, Daniel Blatman, an Israeli professor of contemporary Jewry 
and Holocaust studies, promises an accurate and thought-provoking look on 
the Warsaw ghetto. But critics claim that he ‘is at best being used by the Polish 
government, and at worst is a willing participant in historical distortions’122 
that are already showing in the museum plans. In a Haaretz article, Blatman 
is critical of those scholars who focus on Polish antisemitism ignoring that 
many Poles ‘died at the hands of the same murderers who separated the Jews, 
imprisoned them in ghettos and finally sent them to Treblinka’. Therefore, his 
starting point is the alleged ‘almost complete absence of consideration for the 
existential fears of the non-Jewish population living under Nazi occupation’. 
Finally, he asks: ‘Is it really so terrible to tell the history of the Warsaw Ghetto 
from the perspective of the entire occupied, tormented and devastated city 
where the ghetto existed?’123 In fact, in his scholarly work, Blatman demands 
that Holocaust scholarship enter a post-uniqueness era. He takes side with 
Ernst Nolte in the 1986-7 West German Historians’ Dispute (Historikerstreit) in 
agreeing that ‘the Nazi era should be studied using the same scholarly tools 
applied to all other historical periods’. He also argues—allegedly in agreement 
with Lizzie Collingham—‘that food shortages were one of the most important 
factors that led to the Final Solution’.124
To some degree Blatman’s positions seem to fit that of PiS quite well. In the 
brochure ‘Warsaw Ghetto Museum. Institution under Construction’ he writes 
of ‘genocidal murder’ of Poles committed ‘by the totalitarian regimes during 
the occupation’ and attests Poland being ‘a democratic country that emerged 
from the totalitarian era’,125 thus ignoring the country’s authoritarian back-
lash.126
121 Shaun Walker, Holocaust Historians Divided over Warsaw Ghetto Museum, The 
Guardian, 22 June 2019.
122 Walker, Holocaust Historians.
123 Daniel Blatman, A Tale of History, Force and Narrow Horizons, Haaretz, 4 January 
2019. When it comes to Israel, Blatman speaks of National Zionism, ‘a branch of European 
neo-fascism’.
124 Daniel Blatman, Holocaust Scholarship. Towards a Post-Uniqueness Era, Journal of 
Genocide Research 17, no. 1 (2015), 21-43, 39.
125 Warsaw Ghetto Museum. Institution under Construction [Warsaw 2019], 4.
126 What the PiS government could not achieve during the short period between 2005 and 
2007, it has pushed forward since its election victory in 2015 (confirmed in 2019): it has moved 
aggressively to assert control over the judiciary; it has altered, lowered, or simply removed 
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My analysis of the Warsaw Ghetto Museum’s brochure shows that it does not 
say much about the future museum’s actual content, but what is to be found in 
it amounts to a problematic approach. For instance, the brochure announces 
that ‘the museum’s offer includes lessons on the religion, tradition, and cul-
ture of Polish Jews, as well as those dealing with the problematic aspects of 
the Holocaust’—as if there were any ‘unproblematic’ aspects of the Holocaust. 
Antisemitism is only mentioned once, in the broader context of ‘prejudice’ and 
‘racism’.127 A historical column reprinted from the museum’s website mentions 
four cases of Poles as collaborators: a denunciation, a murder, one betrayal, and 
the role of the Polish Blue Police.128 This is contrasted with, and followed by, 
an interview snippet with a child of ghetto survivors, who is asked if any Poles 
helped his family during the war, and who elaborates on such help.
The exhibition concept has not been published yet. It remains to be seen if 
anything historically accurate will come out of an institution established by 
a government that regulates by law how the past should be remembered. PiS 
ruled in 2018 in an amendment to the Polish Institute of National Remembrance 
(IPN) law that ‘whoever claims, publicly and contrary to the facts, that the Pol-
ish Nation or the Republic of Poland is responsible or co-responsible for Nazi 
crimes committed by the Third Reich […] shall be liable to a fine or imprison-
ment for up to 3 years’.129 When it comes to this so-called Holocaust law, the 
government at least dropped the criminal sanctions after severe domestic and 
international criticism. I argue that in Holocaust-related issues even mnemonic 
warriors are forced to adapt their plans—not primarily due to the elaborate and 
loud domestic criticism that they successfully ignore in most of the other cases, 
but because of pressure from abroad. As to how far PiS will accept international 
criticism in the case of this newest museum project is to be seen.
Conclusion
After Fidesz won the 2010 election, the Hungarian deputy prime minister Tibor 
Navracsics claimed that ‘this is the true beginning of democracy’.130 Prime min-
ister Viktor Orbán called it a ‘revolution of the ballot boxes’.131 Today Orbán’s 
127 Warsaw Ghetto Museum, 9.
128 Warsaw Ghetto Museum, 27-32.
129 Marta Bucholc / Maciej Komornik, The Polish ‘Holocaust Law’ Revisited. The Dev-
astating Effects of Prejudice-Mongering, Cultures of History Forum, 19 February 2019, DOI: 
10.25626/0094.
130 Seleny, Revolutionary Road, 56.
131 Gábor Halmai, A Coup Against Constitutional Democracy. The Case of Hungary, in: 
Mark A. Graber / Sanford Levinson / Mark Tushnet, eds, Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?, 
Oxford 2018, 243-256.
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Hungary is—as he said himself—an ‘illiberal state’.132 Bernhard and Kubik, 
when elaborating on their concept of mnemonic warriors, asked: Do mnemonic 
warriors necessarily threaten democracy? Writing before the Polish election of 
2015, which saw PiS victorious, they argued that while democracy was effec-
tively threatened in Hungary, Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform (PO) government 
was an example of successfully overcoming the destabilizing effects of Polish 
mnemonic warriors. Given how things have evolved after PiS took over, it 
seems solid to argue that when mnemonic warriors are in power, they threaten 
democracy. Their self-understanding leads them to do everything they can to 
assert their values and memory politics, and to discard their opponents.
After the 2010 and 2015 elections in Hungary and Poland respectively, Fidesz 
and PiS mnemonic warriors have proven able to enforce a—never uncontest-
ed, but clearly dominant—memory regime pertaining to historical events of 
national relevance. The flagship museums of previous governments have been 
an important pillar of this memory war in both countries. Even though many 
analysts portrayed Orbán as a liberal or a liberal conservative during his first 
term in government (1998-2002), it was back then that he initiated the House of 
Terror—a museum with a closed narrative, staging Hungarian collective vic-
timhood and Orbán himself as Hungary’s liberator. In contrast, the Kaczyński 
twins were never mistaken for liberal democrats because they openly enforced 
their ‘Fourth Republic’ policy and the patriotic ‘uplifting’ narrative that went 
with it, still exhibited at the Warsaw Rising Museum. In contrast to the Polish 
Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), whose members are to some degree 
still torn between PiS’s politics of history and the IPN’s tradition of critically 
confronting also Polish collaborators, the PiS party itself has proven surprising-
ly coherent when it comes to crafting narratives about the past.
When it comes to museums ‘inherited’ from its mnemonic pluralist predeces-
sor party, the PO, massive international protests did not hinder PiS to change 
the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk toward a more comforting 
narrative of Polish heroism and genocide against Poles. In contrast, memori-
al museums perceived as ‘Jewish’ or as Holocaust museums have not been 
changed. This is in fact a point of convergence between the Polish and Hungar-
ian cases: In both countries, the mnemonic warriors did not try to change or re-
place the ‘inherited’ permanent exhibitions, be that at the MHPJ in Warsaw or at 
the HDKE in Budapest. Instead, they initiated new in situ Holocaust museums, 
the House of Fates and the Warsaw Ghetto Museum—both yet to be actually 
established. Both in Hungary and Poland, mnemonic warriors issued strikingly 
similar statements about planning to exhibit a ‘story of love’ between ‘us’ and 




‘the Jews’. Both chief historians in charge of the institutions made sure to name 
the respective country a democratic one. And in both cases the international 
outcry has had a huge impact on the initial plans. The House of Fates project in 
Hungary has been blocked for over six years now—which proves my argument 
that even parties and politicians who are free to act as mnemonic warriors on 
the national level, cannot act freely when their ‘war on memory’ comes to the 
issue of the Holocaust.
In terms of content, the tendency in both Hungary and Poland has been to 
de-Holocaustize the Holocaust by drawing away attention from the Jewish 
protagonists and victims, and by bringing rescuers of Jews to the fore—a trend 
already more advanced in Poland while present primarily on the verbal lev-
el and still in implementation phase when it comes to Hungarian museums. 
This goes hand in hand with the ‘Holocaustization’ of the history of the ethnic 
Polish and ethnic Hungarian majority, depicted by PiS and Fidesz as the real 
victims of genocide, through the use of wording and aesthetics from Holocaust 
memorialization and musealization. Finally, both trends serve the mnemonic 
warriors to end what they perceive as a ‘pedagogy of shame’—to stop speaking 
about the complicity and perpetrator-ship of their own countrymen.
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